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Frank L. Branson *
HIS Article summarizes and analyzes recent Texas case law concern-
ing personal torts. Developments in negligence, premises liability,
professional negligence, products liability, personal injury damages,




The logical starting point in any discussion of the law of negligence is the
concept of duty.' During the Survey period Texas courts decided a number
of cases interpreting this evolving concept. Building on El Chico Corp. v.
Poole2 and Joleemo, Inc. v. Evans,3 several courts of appeals dealt with the
duties owed by those serving alcoholic beverages. Pastor v. Champs Restau-
rant, Inc.4 was a wrongful death action filed on behalf of a cocktail waitress
killed in a one-car accident. Christine Ann Pastor Fail was a waitress at a
Houston area restaurant. One evening after work, Mrs. Fail remained as a
patron at the bar for approximately four hours. During that time, she con-
sumed dopious amounts of alcohol. When Mrs. Fail left the bar others noted
her stumbling to her automobile. The fatal accident occurred a short dis-
tance from the restaurant, and an autopsy revealed that she died with a
blood alcohol content of approximately 0.17.
In resisting the Dram Shop case, the restaurant filed a motion 5 for sum-
mary judgment, alleging that it owed no duty to patrons who are injured as a
result of voluntary intoxication. 6 The trial court granted the motion for sum-
mary judgment. The court of appeals overturned the summary judgment,
holding that alcoholic beverage licensees owe a duty not to serve alcoholic
beverages to patrons when the licensees know or should know of the patron's
*B.A. Texas Christian University; J.D., LL.M., Southern Methodist University. Attor-
ney at Law, Law Offices of Frank L. Branson, P.C., Dallas, Texas.
1. Kilgarlin & Sterba-Boatwright, The Recent Evolution of Duty in Texas, 28 S. TEX.
L.J. 241, 245 (1986); see Edwards Transfer Co. v. Brown, 764 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. 1988) (Kilgar-
lin, J., dissenting).
2. 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987).
3. Id.
4. 750 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
5. Id. at 337.
6. Id.
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intoxication. 7 Analyzing the supreme court's decision in El Chico,8 the
court reasoned that the duty not to serve intoxicants extends to patrons as
well as the public at large. 9 After recognizing one potential difficulty with
this new duty,10 the court stated that the tavern owner may be entitled to a
jury issue inquiring about the patron's contributory negligence."1
Chapa v. Club Corp. of America 12 considered the duty that bar owners
owe to minor patrons. Julian Chapa, a 15-year old employee of the Lost
Creek Country Club, received serious injuries in an automobile accident in
which he was involved after drinking beer for several hours. Chapa sought
to impose liability on the country club for its violation of a statute making it
a crime to provide alcohol to minors.13 In reviewing the statute in question,
the appellate court found that Julian was in the class of persons for whom
the legislation sought to protect. The country club sought to avoid the appli-
cation of the negligence per se doctrine by arguing that it had no actual
notice that Julian was below the age of 19.14 The court did not decide
whether actual notice of minority must be demonstrated before a duty arises;
instead the court found that the country club did not conclusively prove its
ignorance of Julian's true age.15
Another opinion, Walker v. Children Services, Inc.,16 held that social hosts
have no duty to refrain from serving alcohol to obviously intoxicated
adults.17 In Walker an employee driving a company van began drinking
while on duty. At the conclusion of his route, the employee, Mr. Walker,
returned the van and proceeded home in his own automobile. A one-car
accident left Walker seriously injured, and investigators found that he had a
blood alcohol level of .27. Walker and his wife sued his employer on two
theories of liability. The first theory, based on Otis Engineering Corp. v.
Clark,'8 claimed that Walker's employer, after exercising control over him,
owed Walker a duty because of his drunkenness. The second theory argued
for an expansion of El Chico to include social host liability. The court of
7. Id.
8. 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987). El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 730 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1986), aff'd, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987) and Joleemo, Inc. v. Evans, 714
S.W.2d 394 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986), aff'd, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987) were consol-
idated on appeal.
9. 750 S.W.2d at 337.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 338.
12. 737 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
13. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 106.06 (1978). The statute reads: "[A] person com-
mits an offense if he purchases an alcoholic beverage for or gives or knowingly makes available
an alcoholic beverage to a minor." See also TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 106.01 (Vernon
Supp. 1989) (defining a minor as one younger than 21 years of age).
14. At the time of the offense, for purposes of § 106.06, see supra note 13, the age of
minority was 19. Act of May 7, 1981, ch. 107, §§ 8-9, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 257 (amended
1986). The Texas Legislature changed the legal drinking age to 21 to become effective Septem-
ber 1, 1986. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 106.01, 106.03 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
15. 737 S.W.2d at 430.
16. 751 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied).
17. Id. at 719.
18. 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983).
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appeals rejected both theories.' 9 First, Otis Engineering required that the
employer only take measures to prevent the employee from causing an un-
reasonable risk of harm to others.20 The court concluded that no duty to
protect the drunk employee from his or her own actions exists.2 1
Turning to Walker's second theory of liability, the court declined to ex-
tend El Chico to social host situations. Initially surveying other states' ap-
proaches, the court noted that the majority of jurisdictions do not hold
social hosts liable for injuries caused by intoxicated guests.22 Independent of
other states' laws, however, the court reasoned that social hosts should not
be liable because they are not subject to regulation by the Alcoholic Bever-
age Commission. 23 Social hosts lack the specialized knowledge, experience,
and dispersement controls that commercial alcohol providers possess.24 The
opinion invited the legislature to review the social host liability question and
develop the necessary duty.
25
Several other cases dealt with the duties that arise from control over in-
dependent contractors. In Wilson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 26 and Pon-
der v. Morrison-Knudsen Co. 27 the courts reiterated that control over
subcontractors gives rise to a duty to monitor their work.28 In Ponder a
defendant who retained the right to supervise and control the manner and
details of other entities' work owed a duty to exercise such supervision with
reasonable care. 29 Relying on Redinger v. Living, Inc.,30 a United States
district court focused not on the degree of control actually exercised, but on
the right to exercise such control over subcontractors. 31 Conversely, Wilson
stressed that a general contractor owes no duty to third parties when the
general contractor lacks the right to control the subcontractor's actions.
32
Beans v. Entex, Inc. 33 held that a gas supplier has no independent duty to
inspect and maintain gas heaters that it does not own or control.34 Beans
was a wrongful death suit against a gas company and the manufacturer of a
space heater. In affirming the summary judgment rendered in favor of the
gas company, the court of appeals found that since Entex simply supplied
natural gas, and neither owed nor controlled the defective gas heater, the
utility company owed no duty to inspect or adjust the appliance. 35
19. 751 S.W.2d at 719-20.
20. 668 S.W.2d at 311.
21. 751 S.W.2d at 719.




26. 753 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied).
27. 685 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D. Tex. 1988).
28. Wilson, 753 S.W.2d at 446; Ponder, 685 F. Supp. at 1362-63.
29. 685 F. Supp. at 1362.
30. 689 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. 1985).
31. 685 F. Supp. at 1362.
32. 753 S.W.2d at 447.
33. 744 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).




Diaz v. Southwest Wheel, Inc. 36 is an assumed duty case. The case consid-
ers the duty owed by one who voluntarily undertakes an affirmative course
of action for the benefit of another. In Diaz a worker was injured when
attempting to install a tire mounted on a multi-piece wheel. Southwest
Wheel neither manufactured nor sold the defective wheel to the defendant;
instead, the plaintiff premised liability on Southwest Wheel's failure to ade-
quately disseminate warning and instructional information regarding multi-
piece rims. While recognizing that one who assumes a task or undertakes a
duty must perform that duty in a non-negligent fashion, 37 the court of ap-
peals rejected liability in this case. 38 First, Southwest Wheel's alleged negli-
gence did not increase the risk of rim separation or otherwise make the
accident more likely to happen.39 Furthermore, no proof existed that the
plaintiff's employer relied on Southwest Wheel to warn of the dangers asso-
ciated with a multi-piece rim.4° No recovery exists for the negligent per-
formance of an assumed duty unless the negligence increased the risk of
harm, or the harm was suffered because the injured party relied on the third
party's actions. 41
B. Negligent Entrustment/Hiring
In Schneider v. Esperanza Transmission Co.42 the Texas Supreme Court
appears to have made subtle changes in the law of negligent entrustment.
Schneider was a double entrustment situation that arose when Esperanza
Transmission (Esperanza) provided a pickup truck for the business and per-
sonal use of its employee, Mr. Havelka. Esperanza promulgated a company
policy permitting employees to drive company vehicles, and on one occasion
Havelka drove the company truck to a tavern where he became intoxicated.
Havelka and his drinking companion, Schroeder, then took Esperanza's
truck to a dance hall where they consumed even more liquor. As the pair
prepared to leave the second bar, Havelka asked Schroeder to drive the truck
home. With Schroeder at the wheel, the vehicle smashed into the rear end of
a vehicle in which Barry Schneider was a passenger. Schneider was seriously
injured and brought suit against Esperanza for negligently entrusting its ve-
hicle to Havelka.
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals's take-nothing
judgment on the grounds that no proximate cause existed between Esper-
anza's initial entrustment and the subsequent accident.4 3 The element of
proximate cause that the court focused upon was the defendant's ability to
foresee that a second entrustment would occur.44 This was a somewhat dif-
36. 736 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied).





42. 744 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. 1987).
43. Id. at 597.
44. Id. at 596.
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ferent formulation of proximate cause since prior cases had not emphasized
the foreseeability element in negligent entrustment cases. For example, in
Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter Motor Co.45 the Texas Supreme Court required
claimants to show the causal connection between the owner's negligence in
lending out the automobile and the subsequent injuries to the third person. 46
Mundy listed six factors necessary to establish a case of negligent entrust-
ment, but omitted foreseeability. 47 Regardless of this changed focus in negli-
gent entrustment, Schneider is not a radical departure and does not require
that the exact chain of events leading to the accident be foreseen.
48
Another negligent entrustment case, Drooker v. Saeilo Motors,4 9 discussed
proof of negligent entrustment.50 The underlying lawsuit in Drooker arose
when several employees involved in an accident were on their way to dinner
(intending to return to work after their meal) in a car belonging to a com-
pany manager. In response to a suit for damages, the employer filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment stating that the company did not know that its
employee would be driving the car at the time of the accident and further
swearing that the employee had never been in an accident or received a traf-
fic ticket. The court of appeals held that the evidence did not prove as a
matter of law that the employer was not negligent in entrusting the vehicle
to the driver.51 The employer's ignorance of the entrustment on the occa-
sion in question did not absolve the company from liability since the em-
ployee was generally allowed to drive his manager's car.52 Further, proof
that the employee had no prior accidents or tickets did not conclusively es-
tablish that he was a competent and safe driver.
5 3
C. Vicarious Liability
Negligent hiring and the doctrine of respondeat superior were the topics of
Dieter v. Baker Service Tools.54 Dieter arose from an assault allegedly com-
mitted by two Baker Service Tools (Baker) employees. The assault did not
occur at work and the defendant predicated its motion for summary judg-
45. 146 Tex. 314, 206 S.W.2d 587 (1948).
46. Id. at 321-22, 206 S.W.2d at 591.
47. Id. at 321-22, 206 S.W.2d at 591. The Mundy court explained:
The facts which the plaintiff must establish... to show liability are .... (1) that
defendant's agents permitted [the driver] to drive one of its automobiles; (2) that
at such time [the driver] did not have a driver's license; (3) that defendant's
agents actually knew that he did not have such license; or if they did not have
such knowledge, (4) that defendant's agents were in fact negligent in permitting
[the driver] to drive the automobile without ascertaining whether he had a
driver's license; (5) that [the driver] while in possession under such permission
drove the automobile negligently; and (6) that such negligence on [the driver's]
part caused the collision and the injuries and damage to the plaintiff.
Id.
48. 744 S.W.2d at 596.
49. 756 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).




54. 739 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied).
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ment on the fact that the two men who beat Dieter were acting outside the
scope of their employment. 55 The doctrine of respondeat superior imposes
liability on employers only when the employee's actions are within the scope
of their authority and in furtherance of the employer's business.5 6 Typically,
assaults upon third parties are held to be outside of an employee's author-
ity.57 In Dieter since the action did not take place at work and was not
related to Baker's business, the summary judgment evidence showed that the
assault was one Baker did not authorize and could not have foreseen.58
Therefore, the court did not impose liability under the theory of respondeat
superior.59 The court also rejected the alternate theory of negligent hiring.6°
Since the assault was unrelated to the employment, no nexus between the
hiring decision and the assault existed.6 ' Because they were unable to find
any Texas cases on point, the court of appeals analyzed out-of-state prece-
dent and concluded that negligence in hiring the employee must be the prox-
imate cause of the injuries. 62 To hold otherwise would make an employer
automatically liable for any tort committed by an employee.
D. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Texas courts decided two very different cases involving the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur during the Survey period. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
relieves a plaintiff of proving negligence on the basis that (1) the instrumen-
tality involved was within the defendant's exclusive control, and (2) the oc-
currence is of the type that does not usually happen without negligence. 63
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lerma,64 a suit involving a small child injured in a
department store, discussed the first element. Amanda Lerma had wandered
away from her mother while shopping at a Wal-Mart and was playing on a
store fixture when it toppled over onto her. In seeking recovery for
Amanda's injuries, the plaintiffs relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to
establish Wal-Mart's negligence. Previous courts had applied the doctrine to
cases involving injuries caused by store fixtures, but typically restricted its
use to those situations where the fixtures were entirely within the defendants'
control. 65 In this case, however, because Amanda was swinging on the rack
when it fell over, the instrumentality of harm was not entirely under the
55. Id. at 407.
56. See Leadon v. Kimbrough Brothers Lumber Co., 484 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1972)
(negligent act in question need not be expressly authorized by employer so long as it is in
furtherance of employer's business and within scope of employee's authority); Robertson Tank
Lines v. Van Cleave, 468 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. 1971) (servant's acts must be within scope of
his general authority and servant must be furthering master's business in order to impose
liability on master).
57. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Hagenloh, 247 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex. 1952).
58. 739 S.W.2d at 407.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 409.
61. Id. at 408.
62, Id.
63. Porterfield v. Bringegar, 719 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. 1986).
64. 749 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
65. Id. at 574.
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store's control and therefore the doctrine was inapplicable. 66
City of Fort Worth v. Holland67 involved roof damage to a residence
which occurred when a Fort Worth water main broke. The plaintiff relied
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in order to avoid the need to show a
specific act of negligence on the city's part. While the parties did not dispute
evidence that the water main was within the city's exclusive control, the
testimony was insufficient to demonstrate that the water main would not
break in the absence of negligence. Evidence did not show that the water
main corroded because of negligence or a deviation from the accepted stan-
dards of maintenance of the underground pipes. Further, no evidence linked
the change in pumping pressure or direction with the break. Since the plain-
tiff failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the accident would not
have occurred in the absence of the city's negligence, the court of appeals
refused to allow the plaintiff to rely on res ipsa loquitur to avoid the burden
of proving negligence by direct evidence. 68
E. Premises Liability
In Davis v. Esperado Mining Co. 69 a court of appeals held that any duty to
make premises safe for third-parties is dependent upon ownership, posses-
sion, or control of the property. 70 In Davis the court held that the owner of
a sub-surface estate did not owe any responsibility to make the surface estate
safe for third parties.71 Since the royalty owner had no right to possession or
control of the surface estate and did not create the dangerous conditions
giving rise to the accident, he owed no duty to third parties.72 Similarly, the
court in La Fleur v. Astro Dome-Astro Hall Stadium Corp. 73 refused to im-
pose a requirement upon the owner-operators of the Astro Dome that they
prevent criminal activities occurring on property outside of their possession,
ownership, or control.74 Karen Le Fleur, a television news photographer,
brought suit against the owner-operators of the Astro Dome for injuries she
received during an assault which occurred on property located across the
street from the stadium. The court upheld the Astro Dome's summary judg-
ment and held that a party is not required to prevent criminal activities from
occurring on premises over which the party had no control.75
S&A Beverage Co. v. DeRouen 76 concerned a tavern owner's liability for a
sexual assault that occurred on the premises. Rachel DeRouen was a cus-
tomer at a Beaumont restaurant when an intoxicated patron sexually as-
saulted her. After a jury trial, the jury found that the restaurant's decision
66. Id.
67. 748 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
68. 748 S.W.2d at 115-16.
69. 750 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988 no writ).
70. Id. at 888.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 751 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
74. Id at 565.
75. Id.
76. 753 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, writ denied).
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not to refuse service to the obviously intoxicated criminal was a proximate
cause of the damage. 77 Further, the court of appeals held that the criminal
assault was not a superseding cause of the damages. 78 The court reasoned
that the tavern owner could have foreseen that continued service to an intox-
icated person might lead to violence. 79 Relying on Nixon v. Mr. Property
Management Co.,80 the court emphasized that criminal conduct is a super-
seding cause only when it is unforeseeable a.8  The court required no jury
instruction on "new and independent cause" because that risk was created
by the defendant's negligent actions.8
2
Two other cases involving criminal activities on the premises are worth
comparing. In Blaustein v. Gilbert-Dallas Co., Inc. 83 the Eastland Court of
Appeals reversed a summary judgment in favor of an apartment owner who
claimed to have no responsibility to provide security for tenants.84 The sum-
mary judgment proof showed that the tenant had asked her apartment man-
ager to change the locks on her door before she moved into the apartment.
The manager declined to do so, explaining that only he and the maintenance
man had keys. Additionally, the apartment lease contained a provision al-
lowing the tenant to request such a lock change. Reasoning that the request
and lease created a duty for the apartment owners, the court found fact is-
sues as to whether the leasing company knew or should have known that
criminals had access to Ms. Blaustein's apartment.8 5 In comparison, in
Baley v. W/W Interest, Inc. 86 a Houston Court of Appeals declined to re-
verse a take-nothing judgment in a wrongful death case filed against the
owners and lessee of a Houston night club. 87 The plaintiffs alleged that the
night club was negligent in not having adequate lighting or a uniformed se-
curity guard on the premises where a murder occurred. In finding evidence
to support the jury's verdict, the court noted that the murderer had appar-
ently followed the victim into the night club following a previous incident. 88
No evidence showed the murderer to be inappropriately dressed, intoxicated,
or in any way noticeable. Absent evidence conclusively establishing that the
bar owners or employees knew or should have known that the intruder was
armed, the court upheld the jury's verdict. 89
77. Id. at 509.
78. Id. at 511.
79. Id.
80. 690 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex. 1985). Although criminal conduct of a third party is usu-
ally a superseding cause relieving a negligent actor from liability, a tortfeasor's negligence will
not be excused where the criminal conduct is a result of such negligence. Id.
81. 753 S.W.2d at 511.
82. Id.
83. 749 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, no writ).
84. Id. at 635.
85. Id.
86. 754 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
87. Id. at 318.
88. Id. at 317.
89. Id. at 318. The case is also notable for its dubious holding that jurors who perform
independent investigations of the scene and read newspaper articles to each other concerning
the incident are not guilty of jury misconduct. Id.
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Naumann v. Windsor Gypsum, Inc. 90 involved the alleged defective layout
of the entrance of a plant abutting a state highway. Ronald and Laura
Naumann were injured when their automobile collided with a tractor-trailer
that had just been loaded with sheet rock at the Windsor Gypsum plant in
South Texas. The collision occurred when the truck driver attempted to
turn right across both lanes of the state highway. The trial court granted
Windsor Gypsum's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the
operator of the tractor-trailer was an independent contractor over which the
defendant had no control and that the defendant had no duty to control
traffic on a highway adjacent to its property.9' In upholding the summary
judgment the court of appeals did not directly address these contentions, but
relied on the fact that the truck driver was an independent contractor.92 The
court said that Windsor Gypsum did not owe a duty to see that the in-
dependent contractors performed their work in a safe manner and was not
required to anticipate that truck drivers would block the highway when leav-
ing the plant.93 The court of appeals cast Windsor Gypsum as a third party
who could not foresee the independent contractor's actions. 94 The court
noted that Windsor Gypsum did nothing to increase the hazards or expose
the plaintiffs to danger. 95
Two other cases, Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Henson96 and
Physicians and Surgeons General Hospital v. Koblizek 97involved the method
of submitting jury issues in premises cases. Henson involved a slip and fall
accident that occurred near a shopping center. In submitting the case to the
jury, the plaintiff incorporated the Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 98 and Her-
nandez v. Kroger Co.99 elements of recovery into the instructions and defini-
tions. Construing the new rules of civil procedure, 1'0 the court approved the
broad-form submission. 10 Koblizek, on the other hand, required that the
90. 749 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied).
91. Id. at 190.
92. Id. at 191.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 192.
96. 753 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, no writ).
97. 752 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ). In Corbin v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. 1983), and Koblizek, the court established the essential
elements of a slip-and-fall case. As an invitee, a plaintiff must prove: 1) the possessor had
actual or constructive knowledge of some condition on the premises; 2) the condition posed an
unreasonable risk of harm to invitees; 3) the possessor failed to exercise reasonable care to
reduce or eliminate the risk; and 4) the possessor's failure to use such care proximately caused
the injuries. Koblizek, 752 S.W.2d at 659.
98. 648 S.W.2d at 295.
99. 711 S.W.2d 34, (Tex. 1986).
100. TEx. R. CIv. P. 277: "In all jury cases the court shall, whenever feasible, submit the
cause upon broad-form questions. The court shall submit such instructions and definitions as
shall be proper to enable the jury to render a verdict." Id. (Emphasis added).
101. 753 S.W.2d at 417. The court is almost certainly wrong in its statement that broad-
form issues are not mandatory. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 277 now informs members of
the bar and bench that trial courts "shall, whenever feasible, submit the cause upon broad-
form questions." While some argument may exist that it is infeasible to submit broad-form
questions in premises liability cases, there is no question but that they are required when possi-
1989]
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Corbin and Hernandez elements be submitted as granulated issues. 10 2 Rely-
ing on the Texas pattern jury charge,10 3 the court rejected a general charge
based upon negligence principles. 101
Finally, the court in Dominguez v. Garcia 105 restated well-known princi-
ples that social guests are licensees within the context of determining the
duties owed by premises occupiers. 106 The case arose when a ten-year old
boy went to his friend's birthday party. While at the party, the boy fell on a
stump in the yard and seriously injured his leg. In upholding the summary
judgment rendered in favor of the homeowner, the court of appeals held that
social guests are licensees within the premises liability framework. 0 7 As
such, premises owners/occupiers owe their social guests only the duty not to
injure the guest by willful, wanton, or gross negligence. 10 8 The host does not
owe a duty to warn licensees of dangers, or to make conditions on the prem-
ises reasonably safe. 109
II. PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
A. Medical Negligence - Standard of Care
Several summary judgment cases decided during the Survey period illus-
trated the need to prove the standard of care in medical negligence cases.
Wales v. Williford 110 is a case in which a defendant physician defeated the
plaintiff's case through the use of affidavits from physicians who were from
the defendant's school of training and familiar with local standards of prac-
tice. Dr. Williford established that he had not violated the applicable stan-
dards of care in the case.' 1 ' Pinckley v. Gallegos 12 and Nicholson v.
Naficy 113 are other examples of cases where summary judgment was proper
in light of proof that there had been no violation of the standard of care."14
The holdings in these cases are somewhat limited because they involve fact-
specific questions resolved in summary judgment proceedings. Nevertheless,
these cases are instructive and demonstrate Texas courts' adherence to the
basic elements in proving a medical negligence case.115
ble. Kilgarlin, Quesada & Russell, Practicing Law in the "New Age" The 1988 Amendments
to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 TEX. TECH L. REV. 881, 913 (1988).
102. 752 S.W.2d at 660.
103. 3 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 61.02 (1982).
104. 752 S.W.2d at 660.
105. 746 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied).




110. 745 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, writ denied).
111. Id. at 459.
112. 740 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ denied).
113. 747 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, no writ).
114. Pinckley, 740 S.W.2d at 530; Nicholson, 747 S.W.2d at 5.
115. In order to recover on a medical negligence case, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a provider-
patient relationship; (2) the appropriate standard of care under the circumstances; (3) a breach
of the appropriate standard of care; and (4) proximate cause between the deviation from the
standard of care and the injuries suffered. Perdue, The Law of Texas Medical Malpractice, 22
Hous. L. REV. 1, 47 (1985).
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In Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc. 116 the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals made it clear that corporations cannot practice medicine.' 1 7 In Good
Health the plaintiff filed suit against a Health Maintenance Organization for
injuries to her thumb. The corporation filed for summary judgment on the
grounds that they were incapable of practicing medicine in the state of
Texas. The court agreed, and held that Health Maintenance Organizations
are not liable for the torts of their physicians employed as independent con-
tractors.' 18 The court further held that under the evidence presented in the
case, no liability could exist on the theory that the corporation held itself out
as practicing medicine.' 19 In reaching this conclusion the court noted that
the plaintiffs specifically dealt with a group of independent contractors and
physicians when receiving the medical care.12
0
B. Proximate Cause
In Duff v. Yelin 121 the Texas Supreme Court held that expert testimony
must establish proximate cause between the health care provider's negli-
gence and the patient's injuries. 122 In Duff medical testimony showed two
possible causes of the patient's injuries, but no indication as to which of the
events actually caused the harm. Because the plaintiff failed to show that the
two possibilities were the result of negligence, the court upheld judgment in
favor of the physician.' 2
3
In Stripling v. McKinley 124 the court addressed the necessity of proving
that a physician's failure to adequately disclose the risks of surgery proxi-
mately caused injuries. 125 The court held that the patient must show that an
adequate disclosure of the risks would have caused the patient to forego the
treatment that eventually produced the injuries. 126 The plaintiff contended
that section 6.02 of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement
Act 127 removed the proximate cause requirement in a failure to disclose
case. 128 However, the court interpreted section 6.02 as requiring proof of
proximate cause.
129
116. 743 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).




121. 751 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1988).
122. Id. at 177.
123. Id. A three-judge dissent argued for recovery because testimony showed that the inju-
ries probably occurred while the patient was under anesthesia. Id. at 178 (Mauzy, J., dissent-
ing). The hospital personnel thus had complete control and custody of the plaintiff when the
injuries probably occurred. Id.
124. 746 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ granted).
125. Id. at 505-06.
126. Id.
127. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.02 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
128. 746 S.W.2d at 505.
129. Id. at 505-06. The Texas Supreme Court granted application for writ of error on this
precise point and the cause was submitted on November 30, 1988.
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C. Statute of Limitations
In Kimball v. Brothers 130 the supreme court construed the statute of limi-
tations in medical negligence cases.13 ' The Medical Liability and Insurance
Improvement Act establishes three events that trigger the running of the
statute of limitations: (1) the occurrence of the breach or the tort; (2) the
date on which the health care treatment that is the subject of the claim is
completed; or (3) the date on which the hospitalization for such claim is
made is completed. 132 Kimball arose when the anesthesiologist, Dr. Broth-
ers, experienced difficulty intubating the patient prior to surgery. The pro-
longed intubation allegedly caused respiratory failure and cardiac
insufficiency. Since the cause of action arose from a specific identifiable
event, the court found that the statute began to run on the day of the at-
tempted intubation, and not from the date the hospitalization was com-
pleted. 133 The court rejected arguments that the third provision of the
statute permitted the limitations period to run from the date the patient's
hospitalization upon which the claim was made ended. 134 The express lan-
guage of the statute limited its application to claims based on the hospitaliza-
tion itself, as opposed to specific acts of negligence committed by a doctor. 135
A Dallas Court of Appeals case, Shook v. Herman,136 attempted to clarify
the Kimball holding in a case arising from alleged negligent performance of
eye surgery and negligent follow-up care. In a rather confusing case, the
court appeared to hold that the statute of limitations on specific acts of negli-
gence begins to run immediately, even when they were committed in the
course of an ongoing misdiagnosis and mistreatment.137
In Helman v. Mateo 138 a Houston Court of Appeals reaffirmed that the
discovery rule has been abolished in medical negligence cases.139 The dis-
covery rule is a common-law doctrine which holds that a statute of limita-
tions tolls until an injured party discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have discovered, the existence of a tort. 14' The courts are
in general agreement that the legislature abolished the discovery rule in med-
130. 741 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1987).
131. Id. at 372. The applicable statute of limitations is as follows:
Notwithstanding any other law, no health care liability claim may be com-
menced unless the action is filed within two years from the occurrence of the
breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is the
subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is com-
pleted; provided that minors under the age of 12 years shall have until their 14th
birthday in which to file, or have filed on their behalf, the claim. Except as.
herein provided, this subchapter applies to all persons regardless of minority or
other legal disability.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
132. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
133. 741 S.W.2d at 372.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 759 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ requested).
137. Id. at 746.
138. 751 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
139. Id. at 625.
140. Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex. 1967).
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ical negligence cases in an attempt to alleviate a perceived medical malprac-
tice insurance crisis. 14' Hellman reaffirms this analysis and upholds the
constitutionality of the statute of limitations so long as it does not extinguish
a cause of action before the plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to discover
the wrong and bring suit. 14 2 This modified discovery rule 43 holds that as
long as a plaintiff can discover the wrong and bring suit within the two-year
period, the limitation period runs from the date of the tort or last date of
treatment, and not from the date of discovery.'" Hellman makes it clear
that a plaintiff relying on the modified discovery rule in response to a motion
for summary judgment must raise fact issues concerning the exception. 45 A
good example of this is found in DeLuna v. Rizkallah 146 where the plaintiffs
equivocally argued that they did not have a reasonable opportunity to dis-
cover the wrongdoing within the two-year statute of limitations. Relying
upon Neagle v. Nelson 147 the court in Deluna stressed that the limitations
section of the Medical Malpractice Improvement Act is unconstitutional
when applied to deny plaintiffs the right to sue before they had a reasonable
opportunity to discover the negligence.148 Because the plaintiffs in Deluna
properly raised fact issues concerning their ability to discover the physician's
tort, summary judgment on the statute of limitations was improper.149
Another exception to the absolute statute of limitations in medical negli-
gence cases is the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. Based on Borderlon v.
Peck 150 the fraudulent concealment doctrine estops a health care provider
from relying on a defense of limitations when the provider fraudulently con-
ceals the plaintiff's cause of action.' 5' Evans v. Conlee' 52 is an example of
this doctrine. The Evans court held that fact issues existed concerning the
estoppel effect of the physician continually assuring a patient that a breast
deformity would resolve itself. 5 3 Because of the fiduciary nature of the doc-
tor-patient relationship, the physician had an affirmative duty to inform his
patient of a possible cause of action for negligence. ' 54
In another fraudulent concealment case, Lopez v. Hink,5 5 the plaintiff
argued that the defendant physician could not rely on the statute of limita-
tions as a defense due to his fraudulent concealment of information that he
141. Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex. 1985).
142. 751 S.W.2d at 625; see Morrison, 699 S.W.2d at 207.
143. The phrase "modified discovery rule" originates with Tsai v. Wells, 725 S.W.2d 271,
273 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and Del Rio v. Jinkins, 730 S.W.2d
125, 127 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See Branson, Personal Torts,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 139, 161-62 (1988).
144. 751 S.W.2d at 625.
145. Id. at 626.
146. 754 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
147. 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985).
148. 754 S.W.2d at 368.
149. Id.
150. 661 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. 1983).
151. Id. at 908.
152. 741 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
153. Id. at 508.
154. Id. at 509.
155. 757 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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was required to disclose to the plaintiff.1 56 The plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendant failed to inform her that a growth removed by the defendant was
benign. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment by holding the plaintiff's statement in
an affidavit that the defendant never informed her that the growth was be-
nign was insufficient summary judgment proof.157
Lenhard v. Butler 158 also involved construction of the Medical Liability
and Insurance Improvement Act. Lenhard was a suit by a client against a
psychologist on the grounds that he intentionally or negligently gained com-
plete emotional control over her and used his influence to have sexual rela-
tions with her. Application of the Act was in question because suit was filed
within two years of the date of the last session with the psychologist, but
more than two years after the date of the last sexual liaison between the
parties. Under the continuing treatment provision of the statute, the plaintiff
argued that her lawsuit was timely filed because it was within two years of
the date of the last treatment. In rejecting this argument, the court of ap-
peals held that a psychologist is not a health care provider within the mean-
ing of the statute. 159 The Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act
defines health care providers to include only those duly licensed or chartered
by the state to provide health care.160 Since psychologists are not contained
within the list of persons so designated, the continuing treatment exception
does not apply, and the patient had only two years to bring her suit against
her former therapist.1 6 1 Maddux v. Halipoto162 involved the notice provi-
sions of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, 1 63 and
stands for the proposition that a notice of claim letter must be sent to each
physician or health care provider against whom a claim is to be made.' 64
D. Limitations On Damages
In Lucas v. United States 165 the Texas Supreme Court declared unconsti-
156. Id. at 449-50.
157. Id. at 451.
158. 745 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
159. Id. at 106.
160. The statute states that:
Health care provider means any person, partnership, professional association,
corporation, facility, or institution duly licensed or chartered by the State of
Texas to provide health care as a registered nurse, hospital, dentist, podiatrist,
pharmacist, or nursing home, or an officer, employee, or agent thereof acting in
the course and scope of his employment.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.03(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
161. 745 S.W.2d at 106.
162. 742 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
163. The basic notice requirement of the Act is as follows:
Any person or his authorized agent asserting a health care liability claim shall
give written notice of such claim by certified mail, return receipt requested, to
each physician or health care provider against whom such claim is being made
at least 60 days before the filing of a suit in any court of this state based upon a
health care liability claim.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 4.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
164. 742 S.W.2d at 61.
165. 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
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tutional the provisions of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement
Act' 66 placing caps on medical malpractice damages. 167 In Lucas the par-
ents of a one-year old child who suffered permanent paralysis in his legs after
an injection brought an action against a West Texas army medical center. In
a bench trial the court rendered a $2.9 million judgment in favor of the
family, including $848,000 for medical expenses, $600,000 in lost earning
capacity, and $1.5 million for pain and suffering.' 68 The trial judge refused
to reduce the judgment as required by the Medical Liability and Insurance
Improvement Act. 169 The act placed a ceiling on non-medical damages in
medical negligence cases and contained a mechanism to adjust the ceiling
upward in response to rises in the Consumer Price Index.' 70 On appeal the
Fifth Circuit held that the statute did not violate the due process or equal
protection clauses of the United States Constitution.1 7' The Fifth Circuit
certified a question to the Texas Supreme Court to determine whether the
statute's limitations on medical negligence damages violated the open courts
provision of the Texas Constitution, 72 and whether such limitations applied
to the liability of each defendant or to the damages recovered by each
claimant. 73
The supreme court held that the statutory damage caps violated the open
courts provision, which guarantees access to the courts to redress injuries
caused by another's negligence. 174 Under the open courts provision, courts
cannot uphold statutory limits on recognized common law causes of action if
the court finds such limits unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against
the purpose and basis of the statute. 75 Utilizing this balancing approach,
the court found the caps on medical malpractice damages both unreasonable
and arbitrary. 76 The court found the statute arbitrary due to the fact that it
failed to provide the injured child with any adequate alternative to obtain
redress for his injuries.' 77 The court also found that the legislative purpose
166. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 11.01-11.05 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
167. 757 S.W.2d at 692.
168. 807 F.2d 414, 416 (5th Cir. 1986), question certified to Texas Supreme Court, 811 F.2d
270, 271 (5th Cir. 1987).
169. 757 S.W.2d at 688; see TEX. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 11.02-.03 (Vernon Supp.
1989).
170. Id. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 11.01, 11.04 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
171. 807 F.2d at 416.
172. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (1876, amended 1984).
173. 811 F.2d at 270. This was the first question certified under such a procedure. 757
S.W.2d at 687; see TEX. CONST. art V, § 3-c(b) (1985); TEX. R. App. P. 114.
174. 757 S.W.2d at 687; see TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (1876, amended 1984).
175. Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1983). A litigant challenging a statute on
grounds that it violates the open courts provision must prove that: (1) he had an established
common law cause of action, and (2) the restrictions upon that cause of action are unreasona-
ble in light of the litigant's right to redress balanced against the purpose of the challenged
legislation. Id.
176. 757 S.W.2d at 690-92.
177. Id. The court noted that in two jurisdictions where courts have upheld damage caps,
the statutes also contained alternative remedies for injured victims. This fact strongly influ-
enced the decisions to uphold the caps. See Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 274,
404 N.E.2d 585, 598-601 (1980); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149, 154-58 (La.
1985). In Texas the legislature failed to adopt alternative remedies. 757 S.W.2d at 691.
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behind the statute rendered it unreasonable. 178 The court characterized the
statute as a speculative experiment to determine whether the statutory caps
would have the effect of lowering liability insurance rates. 179 While the court
paid deference to the noble statutory goals, it refused to burden severely
injured victims with the cost of alleviating the liability insurance crisis in the
health care industry.1 80
E. Professional Negligence - Accountants
Greenstein, Logan & Co. v. Burgess Marketing, Inc. ' 8 1 dealt with a profes-
sional malpractice action filed against a group of accountants. In Greenstein
an accounting firm attempted to use a client's misconduct as a contributory
negligence defense. The court of appeals rejected this defense. 182 Relying on
a Nebraska Supreme Court case 1 83 and a Seventh Circuit case,1 84 the court
established a rule that an accountant can only use a client's contributory
negligence as a defense in an accounting malpractice case when the client
has contributed to the accountant's failure to properly audit and carry out
his duties. 185 The court suggested that to hold otherwise would shield ac-
countants from liability for their negligence merely because their clients also




Several cases decided during the Survey period dealt with the duties owed
by liquor manufacturers and distributors. 187 In Malek v. Miller Brewing
Co.' 8 8 the court held that a brewer owed no duty to warn consumers con-
cerning the dangers of driving after consuming beer. 189 The court first noted
that strict liability doctrine specifically excludes alcoholic beverages from the
class of unreasonably dangerous products. 190 The court held that due to the
general public awareness of the dangers of drunk driving, the law imposes no
178. 757 S.W.2d at 691.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 692 (citing Carson v. Mauer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (1980)).
181. 744 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ denied).
182. Id. at 190.
183. Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 Neb. 433, 345 N.W.2d 300, 306-309
(Neb. 1984).
184. Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 880 (1982).
185. 744 S.W.2d at 190.
186. Id.
187. See infra notes 188-197 and accompanying text. See Malek v. Miller Brewing Co.,
749 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Brune v. Brown
Forman Corp., 758 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, no writ); Morris v. Adolph
Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e).
188. 749 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
189. Id. at 524.
190. Id. at 522. The court noted that RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402a, com-
ment (i) (1965) imposes liability only if the product is "dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer... [g]ood whiskey is not unreasona-
bly dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to
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duty upon brewers to warn consumers of the dangers involved in drinking
and driving. 191 In a similar case, Morris v. Adolph Coors Co.,192 the court of
appeals held that a brewer had no duty to warn of the dangers of drunk
driving. 1 93 The court based its decision on the presumption that the ordinary
consumer with ordinary knowledge common to the community knows or
should know the hazards of driving while intoxicated.1
94
Brune v. Brown Forman Corp. 195 presents an interesting contrast to the
Malek and Morris cases. In Brune the court reversed a summary judgment
granted in favor of a liquor manufacturer on the grounds that fact issues
existed concerning the safety of excessive Tequila consumption.1 96 This case
dealt with the manufacturer's duty to warn consumers concerning the risks
of alcohol poisoning. While the average layman should possess an awareness
of the hazards of drunk driving, other dangers associated with alcohol use,
such as acute alcohol poisoning, may impose a duty upon an alcohol manu-
facturer to give adequate warnings. 197
B. Stream of Commerce
O'Neal v. Sherck Equipment Co. 198 reaffirmed the rule that strict products
liability attaches to every party in the business of supplying products who
places such products into the stream of commerce. 199 In O'Neal an em-
ployee brought suit for injuries he received as a result of an unreasonably
dangerous backhoe. The court of appeals noted that strict products liability
extends to any party introducing defective products into the stream of com-
merce.200 Relying on Rourke v. Garza201 the court held that strict liability
can apply to lessors that make defective products available to the public.
20 2
In another case, Graziadei v. D.D.R. Machine Co. ,203 the court makes it clear
that the plaintiff must obtain a jury finding on issues concerning a defend-
ant's actions in placing a product into the stream of commerce. 204
alcoholics .... Id. at 522. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402a, comment (i)
(1965)).
191. Id. at 523-24.
192. 735 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
193. Id. at 583.
194. Id.
195. 758 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ granted).
196. Id. at 831.
197. Id. at 829.
198. 751 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, no writ).
199. Id. at 561; see Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975) (party in business of
introducing products into stream of commerce subjected to strict liability whether such prod-
ucts are leased or sold).
200. 751 S.W.2d'at 561.
201. 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975).
202. 751 S.W.2d at 561. The court went on to hold the leasing company liable for defects
in the product even though the defects did not exist at the time the product was manufactured.
Id. at 562.
203. 740 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied).
204. Id. at 56.
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C Market Share Liability
In Gaulding v. Celotex Corp.205 a court of appeals held that plaintiffs can-
not impose collective or market share liability against a group of manufac-
turers, one of which may have manufactured the defective product.20 6 In
Celotex the plaintiffs stipulated that they could not determine which of the
defendants actually manufactured an injury causing asbestos board. 20 7 The
plaintiff urged the court to adopt the rule in a few other jurisdictions that
allows a plaintiff, unable to precisely identify the party causing his injury, to
bring a collective action against a group of potential tortfeasors in the same
industry.20 8 The court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment in favor of
the defendants on the grounds that Texas does not recognize alternative lia-
bility, collective liability, marketing share liability, enterprise liability, or
concert of action in products liability cases. 209 Noting that the asbestos
board had been purchased secondhand more than thirty years prior to the
commencement of the suit, the court relied upon an Oklahoma Supreme
Court decision 210 in declining to impose collective liability against a group of
defendants, only one of which could have possibly caused the injury.21'
D. Defenses
In Keen v. Ashot Ashkelon, Ltd.21 2 the supreme court held that a manufac-
turer could not use a plaintiff's negligent act of placing himself too close to a
defective trailer as a defense to reduce the amount of the damage award
against the manufacturer. 21 3 Daryel Keen, a hostler driver, parked his vehi-
cle too close to a leaning trailer. 214 The trailer toppled over onto him caus-
ing serious injuries. The trailer manufacturer argued that Keen's
contributory negligence of voluntarily placing himself in a danger zone cre-
ated by the defective trailer should have reduced the damage award. The
supreme court rejected this approach holding that Keen's negligence con-
sisted of a failure to guard against a product defect. 21 5 The court found that
since Keen had no knowledge of the particular defect causing the accident,
his failure to guard against a product defect could not be used as a bar to his
205. 748 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App,-Eastland 1988, writ granted).
206. Id. at 628-29.
207. Id. at 627.
208. See Hall v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. 345 F. Supp. 353, 376-78 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612-13, 607 P.2d 924, 937-38, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 145-46 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich.
311, 343 N.W.2d 164, 174 (1984); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 584-85, 436
N.E.2d 182, 188, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 782-83 (1982). The courts in these cases recognized the
market share or enterprise liability theory.
209. 748 S.W.2d at 628.
210. Case v. Fiberboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062, 1064-1067 (Okla. 1987) .
211. 748 S.W.2d at 628.
212. 748 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. 1988).
213. Id. at 93.
214. A hostler is a motorized vehicle used to pull a loaded trailer from one area in the yard
to another. Id. at 91.




In Ahlschlager v. Remington Arms Co. 21 7 the court held that the manufac-
turer of a rifle was entitled to a jury instruction on a sole proximate cause
defense to a product liability action. 218 Michael Ahlschlager suffered a leg
wound when a companion's rifle fired unexpectedly on a hunting trip. The
parties disputed over competing theories regarding the cause of the accident.
The rifle manufacturer alleged that the companion inadvertently fired the
gun, believing it to be unloaded. The trial court gave a jury instruction on
the defendant's theory that the companion's negligence was the sole cause of
the incident. In affirming the propriety of the instruction, the court of ap-
peals held that the rifle manufacturer had presented evidence showing that
the third party solely caused the accident.2 1 9 That evidence entitled the
manufacturer to have the jury consider such a defense. 220
In Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories Division of American Cyanamid Co.22 ,
the court dealt with the issue of federal preemption. 22 2 The plaintiff sought
to recover for an infant's severe neurological injuries allegedly caused by an
adverse reaction to a DPT vaccine. The trial court granted a partial sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant on the grounds that federal labeling
requirements preempted state common law actions against vaccine manufac-
turers based on inadequate warnings.22 3 In overturning the summary judg-
ment, the Fifth Circuit held that the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act22 4 and the Public Health Service Act2 25 did not preempt state law
claims based on a breach of the duty to warn of a product's dangers.2 26 The
court found that none of the relevant federal statutes explicitly preempted
Texas tort law.227 The court also rejected implicit preemption because FDA
regulations did not prevent states from implementing common law duties
regarding warnings of products risks.228 The court further considered and
dismissed arguments that public health service vaccination programs implic-
216. Id. at 93; see Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 432 (Tex. 1984) ("negli-
gent failure to discover or guard against a product defect is not a defense [in a products liabil-
ity action]"). Chief Justice Phillips dissented on the grounds that Keen's conduct amounted to
more than "a mere failure to discover or guard against a product defect." 748 S.W.2d at 94.
Moreover, Phillips would adopt a system of pure comparative causation allowing the trier of
fact to consider all negligent conduct when apportioning responsibility. Id. at 96. In a sepa-
rate dissent, Justice Gonzalez would have upheld the court of appeals ruling that the jury's
finding of contributory negligence should have reduced the damage award. Id.
217. 750 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
218. Id. at 835-36.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988).
222. Id. at 1176-80.
223. Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 651 F. Supp. 993, 998-
1001, 1007-08 (E.D. Tex. 1988), rev'd, 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988). For a discussion of the
district court opinion, see Branson, Personal Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J.
139, 147 (1988).
224. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
225. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
226. 863 F.2d at 1176.




itly supplanted state product liability law and found evidence that Congress
did not intend to preempt state tort law in this area.
229
Another Fifth Circuit case, McGonigal v. Gearhart Industries, Inc.,230 in-
volved injuries sustained by Army personnel when a grenade prematurely
exploded. Two sergeants, Lane McGonigal and Mark Thompson, suffered
severe injuries when a hand grenade exploded unexpectedly during training.
The service-men filed suit against the company that assembled the grenade
on the theory that the organization failed to adequately inspect the grenade
fuses before providing them to the military. The assembler sought to escape
liability on the grounds that it had immunity as a government contractor.
Relying on a recent United States Supreme Court case, Boyle v. United Tech-
nologies Corp. ,231 the contractor claimed that it had no responsibility for the
loss due to the fact that it adhered to the requirements of the military con-
tract. The court distinguished Boyle and held that the immunity for design
defects outlined in Boyle does not extend to cases arising from the mis-
manufacture of military equipment. 232 Since the plaintiffs based their theory
of liability in the case on the contractor's failure to meet government manu-
facturing specifications, the defendants could not use the defense of govern-
ment contractor immunity. 233
IV. DAMAGES
A. Mental Anguish
Freeman v. City of Pasadena2 34 arose from an automobile accident in
which four Pasadena youths sustained serious injuries when their car ran
into a drainage ditch. The jury awarded damages to the stepfather of two of
the boys injured in the accident, including compensation for mental anguish
suffered as a result of his visit to the scene. The evidence showed that Mr.
Freeman did not witness the accident and that he learned of it only when an
unidentified person rang his doorbell and told him about the catastrophe.
When he went to the scene, Mr. Freeman saw the emergency vehicles and
the crushed automobile and viewed one of his stepsons covered in blood
lying on a stretcher. In upholding the court of appeals take-nothing judg-
ment, the supreme court held as a matter of law that Mr. Freeman had no
cause of action for emotional harm suffered as a result of visiting the acci-
dent scene. 23 5 Relying on the California Supreme Court case of Dillon v.
Legg,2 36 the court explicitly adopted the Dillon three-prong test that plain-
229. Id. at 1177. The court considered the recent National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act,
42 U.S.C. § 300aa -33 (Supp. IV 1986) as evidence that Congress did not intend to preempt
state law with* respect to the products liability of vaccine manufacturers.
230. 851 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1988).
231. 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2518, 101 L. Ed. 2d 442, 458 (1988).
232. 851 F.2d at 777; see Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 573 n.21, 574 (5th Cir.
1985) (governmental immunity for defense contractors not applicable when injuries caused by
manufacturing defects).
233. 851 S.W.2d at 777.
234. 744 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1988).
235. Id.
236. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 919-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79-81 (1968).
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tiffs must meet in order to recover mental anguish damages as a by-
stander. 237 Since the stepfather did not actually witness the accident or
experience shock by unwittingly coming onto the accident scene, the court
considered his emotional shock not reasonably foreseeable. 238 In his concur-
ring opinion Justice Ray explained that the supreme court affirmed the court
of appeal's decision on the bystander theory and did not endorse the appel-
late court's theory that step-parents could not recover for mental anguish
damages suffered as bystanders because of a missing blood relationship.
239
In another bystander case, National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v.
Howard,24° the court considered the question of whether a wife can recover
damages for mental anguish when she is not involved in an accident and
does not meet the Freeman test requirements for bystander mental anguish
recoveries. In Howard a dump truck driver smashed into Arthur Riley's
vehicle from behind. The dump truck demolished the smaller vehicle and
pinned Mr. Riley within the wreckage. A witness to the accident informed
Riley's wife that her husband had been in an accident and brought her to the
scene of the collision. Mr. Riley remained pinned in the vehicle until after
his wife arrived and she spoke to him while he was still trapped in the wreck-
age. In reversing the award for mental anguish damages, the court of ap-
peals held that Mrs. Riley could not recover such damages because she had
not contemporaneously perceived the tragedy.24'
Two Fifth Circuit cases, Snyder v. Whittaker Corp.2 4 2 and In re Air Crash
at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport,24 3 dealt with other facets of Texas mental
anguish recoveries. In Snyder the court found sufficient evidence to support
a jury's award for pain and suffering experienced by the doomed members of
a Texas shrimp boat. 244 The jury awarded damages to the families of two
members of a capsized shrimp boat for the mental anguish and suffering
experienced by the shrimpers during their ordeal. The court upheld the jury
award based on testimony from one witness who saw figures clinging to the
ruptured hull and other evidence indicating that weather conditions would
have permitted a man to survive from eight to twenty hours in the water on
the night of the accident. 245 The court found it reasonable for the jury to
infer that the two men struggled in the water for several hours after their
237. 744 S.W.2d at 923. The relevant portion of the Dillon test reads as follows:
In determining . . . whether defendant should reasonably foresee the injury to
plaintiff.., the court's will take into account such factors as the following: (1)
Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident... (2) Whether the
shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory
and contemporaneous observance of the accident ... (3) Whether plaintiff and
the victim were closely related ....
Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
238. 744 S.W.2d at 924.
239. Id.
240. 749 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
241. id. at 622.
242. 839 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1988).
243. 856 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1988).




boat capsized.246 Analogizing the facts of this case to jury awards for mental
anguish injuries for relatively short pre-impact suffering in plane crashes, the
court approved the jury's verdict. 247
In a more complicated case, In Re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Air-
port,248 the Fifth Circuit attempted to predict whether Texas courts would
allow minor children to recover damages for mental anguish, loss of society,
and loss of familial relationship because of their mother's severe brain dam-
age.249 Linda McGee Ford suffered severe and permanent brain damage as a
result of the 1985 air disaster at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport.
Her two minor children brought suit for lost parental support, care, and
maintenance, as well as for mental anguish and emotional trauma.250 The
trial court granted Delta Airline's motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that Texas law did not provide a cause of action for such injuries
when the parent does not die in an accident. In upholding the summary
judgment, the Fifth Circuit made an "Erie guess" 251 that the Texas Supreme
Court would not allow recovery for such damages. 252 While the court rec-
ognized that the Texas Supreme Court had recently expanded the remedies
available for injured parties, the court held that under Texas law minor chil-
dren of living parents do not have a cause of action for loss of society, dimin-
ished family relationships, or mental anguish. 253
Trailways, Inc. v. Mendoza 254 dealt with the loss of future earnings capac-
ity. Juan Mendoza suffered a loss of earning capacity because of injuries
arising out of a bus wreck. The court upheld a jury verdict awarding dam-
ages for his lost future earning capacity despite the fact that Mr. Mendoza
made more money after the accident than he did before his injuries. 255 The
court pointed out that an increased present income does not prohibit recov-
ery for the lost ability to earn more in the future. 256
In Lopez v. City Towing Associates, Inc. 257 the court made it clear that the
estate of a decedent killed by another's negligence has no cause of action for
lost future earnings.258 Under the Texas Survival Statute,259 a claimant's
cause of action survives to his or her estate, and the legal representative and
heirs may prosecute such an action.26° While the estate may recover all of a
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 856 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1988).
249. Id. at 29.
250. Id.
251. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938).
252. 856 F.2d at 31.
253. Id. One should note that the case did not discuss bystander recovery since the chil-
dren did not witness the accident. For a comprehensive summary of Texas wrongful death
and survival action damages in another case arising from the crash of Delta Flight 191, see
Larsen v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 714, 718-20 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
254. 745 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
255. Id. at 69.
256. Id.
257. 754 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied).
258. Id. at 260.




decedent's losses incurred prior to death, 26 1 the cause of action that survives
does not include the right to recover for lost future earnings.262 While the
Lopez court correctly noted that an estate cannot recover lost future earn-
ings, the beneficiaries may recover wrongful death damages for loss of
inheritance.263
B. Exemplary/Punitive Damages
In Texas punitive or exemplary damage awards serve the purpose of pun-
ishing grossly negligent defendants and deterring similar conduct in the fu-
ture.264 Several cases during the Survey period developed this area of the
law. Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hospital 265 reaffirmed that plaintiffs
can use evidence of a defendant's subjective knowledge to prove gross negli-
gence. 266 In Birchfield the plaintiff offered testimony showing that the hos-
pital involved knew that its practices could cause blindness in new born
infants due to excessive administration of oxygen. The court held ad-
missable evidence that a doctor' prediction at a hospital meeting that the
hospital would have a problem with blindness in new born infants unless the
hospital took steps to improve pediatric facilities. 267 The court also held
admissible into evidence other cases of oxygen-related blindness at the hospi-
tal to show the hospital's conscious indifference to the hazards created by its
conduct. 268
Birchfield gains added significance when coupled with Lunsford v. Mor-
ris.269 In Lunsford the Texas Supreme Court allowed pre-trial discovery of a
defendant's net worth in a gross negligence case. 270 Lunsford overruled a
one hundred year old precedent prohibiting discovery and admission of evi-
dence concerning a defendant's net worth.27 i The court held that in cases
involving punitive or exemplary damage claims parties may discover and
offer evidence of a defendant's net worth.272 The court's rationale stemmed
from the relevance of a defendant's financial resources to the issue of ade-
quate punishment and deterrence. 273 Such reasoning fit neatly into the
Birchfield framework allowing evidence of a defendant's financial condition
in order to show its ability to take proper remedial actions.274
A court of appeals opinion also had a bearing on exemplary damages.
261. See Bedgood v. Madalin, 600 S.W.2d 773, 773 (Tex. 1980).
262. See Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. 1986).
263. 754 S.W.2d at 260.
264. Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex. 1984).
265. 747 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. 1987).
266. Id. at 365; see Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex. 1985).
267. 747 S.W.2d at 365.
268. Id.
269. 746 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1988).
270. Id. at 473.
271. Id. at 471-72. In Young v. Kuhn, 71 Tex. 645, 651-53, 9 S.W. 860, 862-63 (1888), the
Texas Supreme Court held inadmissable any evidence offered to show the financial resources of
a defendant in a tort action.
272. 746 S.W.2d at 473.
273. Id. at 472.
274. 747 S.W.2d at 366.
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Fort Worth Cab & Baggage Co. v. Salinas275 held that the standard of review
for examining exemplary damages awards requires courts to consider a
number of factors including the nature and character of the wrongful con-
duct, the degree of fault on the part of the defendant, the circumstances
surrounding the incident and the sensitivity of the injured party, and the
offensiveness of the conduct to the public's sense of justice.2 76 The opinion
did not create a new approach for reviewing gross negligence damages, but
reaffirmed the standard used in such damage awards.
C. Pre-Judgment Interest
In 1985, the Texas Supreme Court permitted for the first time the recov-
ery of pre-judgment interest on personal injury damages.2 77 Quite under-
standably both courts and litigants have struggled with the application of
this new element of recovery. Federal Pacific Electric Co. v. Woodend 278
demonstrates this difficulty. Since the Cavnar opinion recognized that pre-
judgment interest as an element of a plaintiff's damages in personal injury
suits applied to all cases still in the judicial process, a number of litigants
remain eligible for its application. 279 As stressed in previous supreme court
cases, however, this retroactive grant of pre-judgment interest did not excuse
plaintiff's from the requirement that they plead this element of damages.280
Woodend exemplifies this line of cases and suggests that court's typically
construe a general pleading asking for interest as a request for post-judgment
interest. 281 Court's especially favor this construction when the plaintiff asks
that interest be compounded annually (the method used for calculating in-
terest on the judgment) as opposed to asking that interest be compounded
daily (the pre-judgment calculation). 282 Absent pleading or post-verdict trial
amendments, parties cannot recover pre-judgment interest. 283
Two Texas Supreme Court cases dealt with pre-judgment interest in the
workers' compensation context. Jones v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 284
held that a workers' compensation insurance carrier cannot recover pre-
judgment interest under the portions of the Workers Compensation Act 285
allowing a recovery from third parties.286 The court held that the act explic-
275. 735 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
276. Id. at 306 (citing Tatum v. Preston Carter Co., 702 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Tex. 1986) and
Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981)).
277. Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985), holding limited
in Steves Sash & Door Co. v. Ceco Corp., 751 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex. 1988).
278. 735 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
279. 696 S.W.2d at 555.
280. See Vidor Walgreen Pharmacy v. Fisher, 728 S.W.2d 353, 353 (Tex. 1987) (prejudg-
ment interest disallowed due to plaintiff's failure to plead it as element of damages); Benavides
v. Isles Constr. Co., 726 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Tex. 1987) (recognizing rule that parties must specifi-
cally plead prejudgment interest).
281. 735 S.W.2d at 896.
282. Id.; 696 S.W.2d at 554.
283. 735 S.W.2d at 896.
284. 745 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1988).
285. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
286. 745 S.W.2d at 903.
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itly limited compensation carriers' recovery to past compensation, medical
benefits, and attorneys fees. 287 Since the act does not specifically allow for
recovery of pre-judgment interest, the court could not uphold such an
award. 288 In Moseley v. State Department of Highways and Public Transpor-
tation 289 the court underscored this point and prohibited a self-insured state
agency from recovering pre-judgment interest in an identical subrogation
situation.290
V. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
A. Contribution
International Proteins Corp. v. Ralston-Purina Co. 291 dealt with a joint
tortfeasor who settled and took an assignment of the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion and then sought contribution from a non-settling defendant. Barkley
Feed & Seed sued International Proteins Corporation (IPC) and Ralston-
Purina Company (Purina) for damages arising from Barkley's purchase of
contaminated feed. Before trial, Purina entered into a settlement with Bar-
kley that included an assignment to Purina of any damages that Barkley
might recover from a third party. On appeal, Purina argued that it was
entitled to contribution amounting to thirty percent of the damages on the
basis of the jury's finding IPC thirty percent responsible for Barkley's inju-
ries. Relying on the rule recently announced in Beech Aircraft Co. v.
Jinkins,29 2 the court held that the mere assignment of a plaintiff's cause of
action to a settling defendant does not entitle the settling defendant to seek
contribution from non-settling defendants. 293 While the general rule allows
parties to assign causes of action, the court found that public policy prohib-
ited joint tortfeasors from purchasing a plaintiff's cause of action. 294 The
court held that Purina could only settle its proportionate share of liability
and could not seek contribution by means of taking an assignment of Bar-
kley's right to recover from IPC.295
In State Department of Highways & Public Transportation v. Pruitt 296 the
Tyler court of appeals concluded that settling defendants must remain in the
primary lawsuit in order for non-settling defendants to have their contribu-
287. Id.
288. Id. at 902.
289. 748 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. 1988).
290. Id.
291. 744 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1988).
292. 739 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1987). In Beech Aircraft the defendants in a products liability
action arising from an air crash settled with one of the co-plaintiffs and obtained an assignment
of that plaintiff's contribution claim against the other plaintiff. The court held that a settling
co-defendant cannot preserve contribution rights by means of taking an assignment from a
plaintiff. Id. at 22.
293. 744 S.W.2d at 934.
294. Id.
295. Id.; see Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Jinkins, 739 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Tex. 1987). For an exam-
ple of a similar application of the Jinkins rule, see Texas Distribs., Inc. v. Texas College, 747
S.W.2d 371 (Tex. 1987).
296. 752 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no writ).
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tion claims determined. 297 The dispute in this case arose when the City of
Timpson, one of the defendants, settled with the plaintiff. The State of
Texas, another defendant, filed a cross-action against the city. The trial
court denied the state the opportunity to have the issue of the city's negli-
gence submitted to the jury. The court of appeals found reversible error in
the trial court's refusal to submit instructions to the jury concerning the
city's negligence for the purpose of comparative causation. 298
B. Indemnity
B-F- W Construction Co. v. Garza 299 concerns the express negligence doc-
trine adopted by the Texas Supreme Court in Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Construc-
tion Co.300 Under Ethyl parties seeking indemnification for their own
negligence must expressly and specifically state that intent within the indem-
nity contract. 30 1 The document under consideration in B-F- W Construction
provided that the subcontractor would indemnify the general contractor in
all circumstances. The court of appeals found that such language was unam-
biguous and that it met the Ethyl test.30 2
Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. Dobbs30 3 involved another unambiguous
indemnity contract in which the court reiterated the Ethyl rule. 3°4 The
court further held that defendants must plead and prove the affirmative de-
fenses of concurrent or contributory negligence to an indemnity contract. 30 5
The indemnitor in Kirby failed to meet this burden by filing only a general
denial.306
VI. IMMUNITY
A. Texas Tort Claims Act
Two court of appeals cases dealt with the state's liability for unsafe high-
way conditions. In State Department of Highways & Public Transportation v.
Bacon 307 the court held that the state's failure to warn of known hazardous
road conditions can subject it to liability. 308 The suit arose when Janice
Bacon, her mother, and her husband sustained serious injuries in a head-on
collision caused by ice on the road. The jury found no negligence on the part
of the driver and also found that none of the plaintiffs had actual knowledge
of the ice covering the bridge where the accident occurred. The jury found
297. Id. at 600.
298. Id. at 602.
299. 748 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
300. 725 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. 1987).
301. Id.; see Branson Personal Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 139, 158-59
(1988).
302. 748 S.W.2d at 613.
303. 743 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ denied).
304. Id. at 354.
305, Id.
306. Id.
307. 754 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied).
308. Id. at 281.
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that the State Highway Department had actual knowledge of the icy condi-
tion of the bridge and breached its duty of care to the plaintiffs by failing to
warn the public of the dangerous condition. The court analogized the duty
owed by the state to motorists on state highways to the duty owed to licen-
sees by owners of private property. 30 9 When premises owners have actual
knowledge of a dangerous condition and a licensee does not, the premises
owner must either warn of the condition or take reasonable steps to elimi-
nate or alleviate the condition.310 Since the evidence supported the jury's
findings that the vehicle drivers lacked knowledge of the icy conditions pres-
ent on the bridge, the court upheld jury's verdict. 3 11
In Shives v. State3 1 2 the El Paso court of appeals held that the state could
not be liable for the defective design of a highway intersection. 31 3 The court
first noted that the suit involved an intersection that had been constructed
fourteen years prior to the effective date of the provisions of the Texas Tort
Claims Act3 14 that waive immunity for certain governmental activities.31 5
Since the waiver only applied to acts and omissions occurring after January
1, 1970, the court held that the waiver did not apply in this case. 3 16 The
court further held that since the plaintiff based his claims on the state's negli-
gence in installing stop signs and stop bars on the roadway, the statutory
exemptions for discretionary traffic control decisions prohibited the suit. 3 17
Under the statutory provisions in effect at the time of the collision, plaintiffs
could not sue the government for its failure to perform actions not required
by law.31 8 In addition, specific grants of immunity covered the state's failure
to initially place traffic signs, signals, and devices properly, and such omis-
sions did not give rise to a cause of action against the state.31 9
In Bourne v. Nueces County Hospital District320 the court considered the
question of the state's liability for discharging a mental patient from institu-
tional care. The case involved the wrongful deaths of a father and daughter
when a family member recently released from a mental hospital set fire to
their house. The plaintiffs based their theory of liability on the premise that
the county hospital district had used tangible property, in this case its psy-
chiatric ward, by discharging the patient. 32 1 The court rejected this ap-
proach noting that the true allegations concerned the hospital district's non-
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 281-82.
312. 743 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ denied).
313. Id. at 716.
314. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 14 (repealed 1985), recodified at TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.021-.028 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1988).
315. Id.
316. 743 S.W.2d at 716.
317. Id. at 717. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 14(12) (repealed 1985), recod-
ified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.060 (Vernon 1986).
318. 743 S.W.2d at 716; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 14(7) (repealed 1985),
recodified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.056 (Vernon 1986).
319. 743 S.W.2d at 716; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 14(12) (repealed
1985), recodified at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.060 (Vernon 1986).
320. 749 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
321. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989)
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use of its mental facilities. 322 The gravamen of the complaint was that the
state did not confine the schizophrenic family member in the hospital dis-
trict's building; as such, the complaint alleged a non-use, which did not give
rise to a cause of action under the Texas Tort Claims Act.323
On a separate issue, the court in Bourne held that the emergency room
records compiled in the case did not satisfy the statutory notice provisions
required in a suit against the government. 324 The plaintiff argued that the
emergency room records of injuries arising from the fire constituted actual
notice of the pending claim. The court disagreed reasoning that the govern-
mental unit must have notice of their potential culpability as well as the
plaintiff's intent to file a claim. 325
Two cases decided during the Survey period involved school bus acci-
dents. In Mount Pleasant LS.D. v. Estate of Lindburg326 a school bus driver
dropped seven year old Misty Lindburg off at a rural bus stop. After waiting
a sufficient amount of time to allow the child to cross the highway, the driver
drove on when he child did not cross. Several minutes later a pickup truck
struck the child as she attempted to cross the highway. The court barred the
claim on sovereign immunity grounds and held that claim did not fall within
the sovereign immunity exception for injuries caused by the operation or use
of a motor vehicle.3 27 The court's based its holding on the fact that the bus
itself was not involved in the accident. 328
The Lindburg court also addressed the issue of whether to subject school
bus operators to the high degree of care imposed on common carriers. 329
The court refused to impose the common carrier standard of care on school
bus operators. 330 The court reasoned that school districts are not in the
business of transporting passengers for hire and the court further rejected
the policy reasons advanced for increasing the standard of care owed to
school bus riders.33'
In Hitchock v. Garvin 332 the Dallas court of appeals held that a school bus
driver's failure to activate the flashing warning lights while at bus stops falls
within the waiver of governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims
("A governmental unit in the state is liable for... (2) personal injury and death so caused by a
condition or use of tangible personal or real property.) (emphasis added).
322. 749 S.W.2d at 632.
323. Id.; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1986).
324. 749 S.W.2d at 632. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(c) (Vernon 1986)
provides that: "The notice requirements ... do not apply if the governmental unit has actual
notice that death has occurred, that the claimant has received some injury, or that the claim-
ant's property has been damaged."
325. 749 S.W.2d at 633.
326. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. 1. 210 (Feb. 18, 1989).
327. Id. at 212; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1986) (pro-
viding that sovereign immunity does not apply if the injury is caused by the "operation or use
of a motor-driven vehicle.")




332. 738 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1987, no writ).
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Act.333 The proof in the case created fact issues concerning the bus driver's
failure to properly activate the flashers on the bus to warn oncoming motor-
ists. The school district's bus program required the use of such flashing
lights and the court held that the failure to comply concerned the operation
or use of the motor-driven school bus.3 34
B. Governmental Immunity
Russell v. Texas Department of Human Resources335 involved governmen-
tal immunity in a case brought by a set of parents and grandparents against
the Department of Human Resources for the negligent investigation of a
sexual abuse case. Claiming that the Department of Human Resources neg-
ligently investigated the possible sexual abuse of a child, the targets of the
investigation filed suit for damages. The court of appeals upheld the trial
court's summary judgment in favor of the defendant characterizing the state
investigator's actions as quasi-judicial. 336 The court held that state employ-
ees acting in a quasi-judicial capacity enjoy governmental immunity regard-
less of how negligent, insensitive, or misguided their actions if they act in
good faith and within the scope of their authority.337
In Davis v. City of San Antonio338 the court discussed the appropriate pro-
cedural steps necessary to raise a claim of governmental immunity. 339 Davis
sued the City of San Antonio for malicious prosecution and violations of his
civil rights. Although the case arose from the city's discretionary actions, the
city did not raise the defense of sovereign immunity until it filed its motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In reversing the court of appeals,
the supreme court held that the city did not timely assert the defense. 34°
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure clearly require litigants to raise all af-
firmative defenses, including defenses of immunity. 341 The city's decision to
raise the defense of immunity after the case had been tried constituted a
waiver of any possible affirmative defense. 342
333. Id. at 37. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1986), allows
recovery for personal injury and death arising from the operation and use of a motor-driven
vehicle.
334. 738 S.W.2d at 37.
335. 746 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied).
336. Id. at 513.
337. Id. The court also decided that allegations that the state used tangible personal prop-
erty, including telephones, computers, and report forms, did not give rise to a cause of action
under TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1986). 746 S.W.2d at 513.
338. 752 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 1988).
339. Id. at 519-20.
340. Id.
341. Id.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
342. 752 S.W.2d at 519.
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